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Dropped Calls:
The Extent of the Free Speech Guarantee
to Wireless Communications Service
by
CANDICE SHIH

I. INTRODUCTION
As President Hosni Mubarak scrambled to hold on to control of
Egypt in the face of tens of thousands of protesters in January 2011,
he made a most modern decision. “One by one, the lines of
communication that connected Egypt to the 21st century shut down.
Twitter, Facebook, and eventually all Internet access were cut off;
text messaging became impossible, and then millions of mobile
1
phones went silent across the country.” As the world knows, it was
for naught; Mubarak’s retirement was announced on February 11,
2
2011.
Egypt has not been alone in disabling such infrastructure during
the Middle East uprisings known as the Arab Spring that began in
3
late 2010. As the anti-government protests spread across the region,
4
Libya cut off Internet almost entirely, Syria intermittently shut down

1. Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., Rage Against the Regime, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17,
2011, at 18.
2. David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
(Feb.
11,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html.
3. Timeline: The Major Events Of The Arab Spring, NPR (Oct. 6, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/144489844/timeline-the-major-events-of-the-arab-spring
4. David D. Kirkpatrick & Mona El-Naggar, Qaddafi’s Son Warns of Civil War as
(Feb.
20,
2011),
Libyan
Protests
Widen,
THE NEW YORK TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/world/africa/21libya.html.
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its 3G mobile network; 5 and web traffic in Bahrain was reduced by
6
ten to twenty percent, with sites such as YouTube blocked.
China imposed an even longer blackout when it terminated
Internet and cell phone service in July 2009 in the Xinjiang region to
7
stop the spread of deadly ethnic rioting. The government, known for
its censorship apparatus called the Great Firewall, fully restored the
communication services ten months later after the threat of violence
8
had dissipated.
Americans cannot be confident that they are immune from such
restrictions on modern communication. On August 11, 2011, the Bay
Area Rapid Transit System (BART) shut down cell phone and
wireless service in an effort to thwart protestors, angry about a fatal
shooting of a knife-wielding man by a BART police officer in San
9
The parallel
Francisco, from disrupting transit services.
characteristics to foreign events were immediately evident. In all of
these cases, the state or a state agency terminated a wireless service
on the grounds of public safety. Creating neologisms out of the
familiar situation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation said, “BART
10
Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco,” and Egyptian activists called the
11
transit system’s move a “muBARTak.” However similar these acts
by BART were to those of Mubarak, the question to be considered in
this Note is whether they violated the free expression guarantee of

5. Jennifer Preston, Seeking to Disrupt Protesters, Syria Cracks Down on Social
Media,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
(May
22,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/middleeast/23facebook.html.
6. Fahmida Y. Rashid, Bahrain Restricts Internet Traffic, Blocks YouTube in
Crackdown on Protests, EWEEK (Feb. 18, 2011), http://eweek.com/c/a/Security/BahrainRestricts-Internet-Traffic-Blocks-YouTube-in-Crackdown-on-Protests-386152/.
7. Internet cut in Xinjiang to Prevent Spread of Riot’, CHINA DAILY, (July 7, 2007),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-07/07/content_8387845.htm; Edward Wong,
After Long Ban, Western China Is Back Online, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (May 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/world/asia/15china.html.
8. Wong, supra note 7.
9. A Letter From BART to Our Customers, Bay Area Rapid Transit, (Aug. 20,
2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820.aspx; Michael Cabanatuan,
BART Admits Halting Cell Service to Stop Protests, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, (Aug.
13, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/BART-admits-halting-cell-service-to-stopprotests-2335114.php
10. Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (Aug. 12, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/bart-pulls-mubaraksan-francisco.
11. Joshua Hersh, Egyptian Activists See Hypocrisy in BART Shutdown, London
POST,
(Oct.
16,
2011),
Riots,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/16/bart-london-riots-egypt_n_928144.html.
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the First Amendment 12 and the constitutional validity of related
possible governmental interference with wireless communications.
Reflecting concern among the public that BART exceeded its
authority, the Federal Communications Commission (“F.C.C.”)
13
began a continuing investigation on August 15, 2011. The F.C.C.
stated, “[a]ny intentional interruption of wireless service, no matter
how brief or localized, raises significant concerns and implicates
substantial legal and policy questions . . . . We are concerned that
there has been insufficient discussion, analysis, and consideration of
the questions raised by intentional interruptions of wireless service by
14
government authorities.”
In the meantime, BART adopted a new policy on December 2,
2011, permitting future interruption of wireless communication only
where “‘there is strong evidence of imminent unlawful activity’
threatening safety, property or service” and only in limited areas and
15
during limited time periods. In fact, “[u]nder the new policy, BART
would not have turned off the wireless phone system under
circumstances similar to those in August” but instead would have
instructed police officers to arrest people who were breaking the
16
law.

12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. Sara Jerome, FCC Probing Wireless Blocking by San Francisco Authorities,
NATIONAL
JOURNAL
(Aug.
15,
2011),
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2011/08/fcc-probing-wireless-blocking.php; FCC
Chairman Julius Genachowski’s Statement on BART Policy Adoption, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/document/fccchairman-julius-genachowskis-statement-bart-policy-adoption.
14. Commission Seeks Comment on Certain Wireless Service Interruptions, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
(Mar.
1,
2012),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0301/DA-12-311A1.pdf.
[hereinafter Commission Seeks Comment].
15. Michael Cabanatuan, BART Cell Phone Shutdown Rules Adopted, SAN
FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE,
(Dec.
2,
2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/01/BA1C1M74UB.DTL&tsp=1.
16. Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Asks for Guidance on Whether, and When, to Cut Off
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
(Mar.
2,
2012),
Cellphone
Service,
THE
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/technology/fcc-reviews-need-for-rules-to-interruptwireless-service.html. Additionally, California legislators considered a bill that would
require a magistrate order to implement an interruption in wireless service, although it
was vetoed by the governor for putting too much pressure on law enforcement officials
responding to an emergency.
S.B. 1160, 2011-2012 Reg. Se.. (Ca. 2012),
http://www.leginfor.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_11511200/sb_1160_bill_20120831_enrolled.pdf, http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_11511200/sb_1160_vt_20120929.html; Don Babwin, Chicago Asked Not to Stifle Wireless at
Summits,
THE
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
(Feb.
15,
2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9SU230O0.htm.
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Whether BART itself faces another occasion in which to consider
disabling its wireless infrastructure, future protests and threats to
public safety in the United States are inevitable. To that end,
Congress has considered bills that would grant the President the
ability to essentially shut down the Internet, including the Protecting
17
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act and the Cybersecurity Act of
18
2010. Whether a shutdown of cell phone and wireless services is
local or national in scale, the government’s interests must be balanced
with First Amendment rights. This Note will discuss the various
doctrines that inform when such a termination of modern
communication systems is constitutional and when it is not.

II. BACKGROUND
What First Amendment rights do we as Americans have to
wireless Internet and phone access? Consider a brief examination of
older forms of communication.
The Constitution itself only
envisioned the Postal Service as a means of communication between
19
distant parties. However, the right to send mail through the federal
system is not absolute, as the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute
allowing residents to remove their names from mailing lists in Rowan
20
v. United States Post Office Dept. The sender did not have a First
Amendment right to send unwanted mail; because it was unwanted
and invaded the home, the Court likened the sender’s act to a form of
21
trespass that did not warrant such constitutional protection.
Further, the Constitution does not mandate the provision of landbased telephone lines.
As with mail, courts have held that one’s First Amendment right
to use a phone is not absolute. For example, prisoners’ phone rights
are “subject to rational limitations in the face of legitimate security

17. Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, S. 3480, 111th Cong. § 249
(2nd Sess. 2010).
18. Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 18 (1st Sess. 2009). However,
considering the successful protests against SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) and PIPA
(Protect Intellectual Property Act) on Jan. 18, 2012, passage of such an act would likely
face significant civic hostility and political backlash. See Andrew Rosenthal, Behold the
Power
of
Google,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
(Jan.
18,
2012),
http://loyalopposition.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/behold-the-power-of-google/. (On the
same day thousands of websites, most notably Wikipedia, instituted a blackout in protest
of the bills, Congress members pulled their support for them).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. See generally, U.S. CONST.
20. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
21. Id. at 735-37.
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interests,” 22 and drivers in many states, including California, are
banned from using cell phones to send text messages to avoid
23
distractions. Both situations involve a content-neutral ban, which
faces a lower level of judicial review. To meet that standard of
review, the restriction must be “narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest” and leave open ample alternative
means of communication, as articulated in Ward v. Rock Against
24
Racism. Restrictions on phone use while imprisoned or driving
appear appropriately tailored to the safety interest that the
government promotes.
As for the alternative means of
communication, prisoners, who already face limited rights, may be
permitted use of land-based phones and drivers can simply pull over
and commence with texting.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Internet receives
full First Amendment protection in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
25
Union, even though it is unclear when that protection is outweighed
by other concerns that include public safety. “(T)he Internet – as ‘the
most participatory form of mass speech yet developed’ – is entitled to
26
‘the highest protection from government intrusion.’” In striking
down a federal statute that restricts the computer transmission of
indecent material to minors on First Amendment grounds, the Court
declined to apply the jurisprudence it has developed relating to
27
broadcast media. Special justifications for regulating television and
radio include the scarcity of available frequencies and the “invasive”
28
nature of such media. But “[t]hose factors are not present in
cyberspace,” a vast democratic forum that has not been subject to the
government supervision and regulation long associated with the
29
broadcast industry.
A consideration of the limits of First Amendment freedoms
regarding new media necessitates analysis under the Supreme Court’s
established doctrines of content neutrality, public forums,

22. Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986).
23. Cell Phone and Texting Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOCIATION.,
(Sept. 2012), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone_laws.html.
24. 491 U.S. 781, 796, 802 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) at p. 796).
25. 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997).
26. Id. at 863 (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J., supporting opinion)).
27. Id. at 868.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 868-69.
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overbreadth, and prior restraints. 30 The strength of the government’s
justification for blocking wireless communication will depend on
which doctrine is employed. However, under any doctrine, the
government should find significant constitutional limitations on such
action, and rightly so as Internet and cell phone use grows to
dominate modern forms of communication.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Content Neutrality

A threshold question for determining the government’s ability to
restrict First Amendment activity is whether the government action is
31
content-based or content-neutral. When an action or statute is
32
content-based, it is presumed to be invalid and the government must
survive strict scrutiny review by demonstrating a compelling
government interest that is addressed through the most narrowly
33
tailored means. Narrow tailoring is achieved under strict scrutiny if
34
When a
less restrictive alternative means are not available.
regulation is content-neutral, the government only needs to establish
that it has a significant interest that is narrowly tailored while leaving
35
The narrow
open ample alternative means of communication.
tailoring requirement is less stringent under the Ward analysis, as it is
satisfied as long as the regulation would be achieved less effectively
36
absent the regulation.
1.

The Government’s Termination of Wireless Communication to Squelch
Protest Should be Considered Content-Based and thus Subject to Strict
Scrutiny.

Terminating a geographic area’s access to wireless communication
appears to be content-neutral on its face. Although other countries
have blocked certain sites such as Twitter and Facebook, what took
place in San Francisco was a blockage based on a medium, not any
particular content provider. No one in the downtown San Francisco

30. Another doctrine, vagueness, is not likely to be a direct concern where the
government has acted to shut down wireless access to the Internet and mobile phone
infrastructure.
31. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
32. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
33. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
34. Id.
35. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796, 802.
36. Id. at 799 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
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BART stations on Aug. 11, 2011 could use their cell phones to call,
text, or communicate with anyone. However, BART’s purpose was
not only content-based, but arguably viewpoint-based, which makes
37
its action even less likely to be constitutional. The reason behind the
interruption of cell phone communication at BART was to prevent
38
protestors from gathering and disrupting service. BART wanted to
prevent a particular message from being distributed among
protestors, for example, “Come to Civic Center Station at 4:30 p.m.
39
We’re going to stop service by chaining ourselves to the trains.”
With the focus on a specific message, BART’s purpose was contentbased and possibly viewpoint-based even though its action was
facially content-neutral. One could draw the same conclusions
regarding the protests in Egypt and to hypothetical future protests in
the United States; where wireless communication has been
terminated to thwart a protest, the purpose is content-based while the
action may be facially content-neutral.
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates that a statute
that is content-neutral on its face but content-based in purpose may
be held to a higher degree of scrutiny. The Ward Court stated: “The
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases
generally . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The
40
government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.” In Ward,
the Court determined the government’s purpose was content-neutral
as it intended to control noise levels to protect neighborhood
41
character, rather than a particular type of sound or noise.
In
contrast, the government’s purpose in terminating wireless
communication is to silence public demonstrations, not eliminate all
cell phone conversations or Internet use.
This argument may appear to be undercut by the Court’s holding
in United States v. O’Brien that the government’s purpose in
37. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000). (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v.
Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980)).
38. Letter From BART, supra note 9.
39. See Cabanatuan, supra note 15.
40. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (“In
determining whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, we look to the
purpose behind the regulation . . .”) and Turner, 512 U.S. at 642 (“[A] content-based
purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content
based . . .”). But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993)
(rejecting a test for content neutrality based on the justification for the regulation). (citing
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 295).
41. Ward, 491 U.S. at 792.
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restricting speech does not factor into the constitutional analysis. 42
However, the Court only explicitly stated that it could not void
legislation based on congressional purpose given the dangers of
43
relying on the statements of “fewer than a handful of Congressmen.”
In the later case of Ward, the Court relied on the government’s
“clearly content-neutral goals” to determine it should apply an
44
intermediate level of review in evaluating the restriction. In fact,
O’Brien and Ward are not inconsistent but may be applied together;
whereas the O’Brien Court refused to look at government purpose to
invalidate an act, the Ward Court considered the government purpose
only in deciding which level of review to apply. One analyzing the
BART situation could consider the government’s purpose to be
content-based and apply strict scrutiny review, without violating
O’Brien’s instruction not to leap directly from government’s purpose
to invalidation.
O’Brien is also inapt to the BART scenario because the statute at
issue there had no “inevitable unconstitutional effect” given that the
45
In
destruction of draft cards was not necessarily expressive.
contrast, shutting off wireless communication services has an
unconstitutional effect by abridging a significant amount of
expressive, constitutionally protected speech. If they had the
technological ability on August 11, 2011, the thousands of people who
used or rode through the downtown BART stations during the
46
weekday rush hour would likely have generated hundreds, if not
thousands, of calls, text messages, and other forms of communication
unrelated to participation in the protest. (In fact, many would have
likely sent a message such as this: “BART delayed. Will be late.”)
Lower courts have relied on Ward, without referencing O’Brien,
in finding that a government regulation is content-based because the
government’s purpose was content-based. In particular, the Third
Circuit reviewed a case in which an anti-abortion demonstrator was
removed from a sidewalk in front of the Liberty Bell Center in
Philadelphia by National Park Service rangers in United States v.
47
Marcavage. The court rejected an argument that removing the
protestor was a content-neutral action because the government was
42. 391 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1968).
43. Id. at 384.
44. Ward, 491 U.S. at 782-83.
45. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 385.
46. See
Monthly
Ridership
Reports,
BAY AREA RAPID
http://www.bart.gov/about/reports/ridership.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
47. 609 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2010).

TRANSIT,

2012]

DROPPED CALLS

235

concerned about public safety and he was impeding traffic flow. 48
49
Citing Ward, the court looked at the evidence, including testimony
50
of the government’s witnesses, to determine the government’s
51
purpose was in fact content-based and that its action must therefore
52
be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Also relying on Ward, a District
Court applied strict scrutiny after finding a statute that prohibits the
influence of a judge or juror was content-based because the
53
government’s purpose in enacting it was content-based despite the
application’s facial content-neutrality:
It is the message of influence itself which is conveyed in these
communication[s] and which the statute seeks to prevent. The
justification for the statute is to prevent the evil associated
with the content of these communications. The question of
whether a communication to a judge or juror violates Article
54
247 depends on the content of the communication.
Despite indications that a content-based purpose could doom a
facially content-neutral action, the Supreme Court “almost never
55
labels an action according to this determination.” The problem is
that finding sufficient evidence that the purpose in question truly is
content-based is difficult to do, thus requiring a challenger to
successfully argue it is facially content-based in order for a court to
56
apply strict scrutiny. Although such factual findings are rare or even
57
avoided, as in Hill v. Colorado, they were discovered in Marcavage
48. Id. at 280.
49. Id. at 279.
50. Id. at 281.
51. Id. at 283.
52. Id. at 286.
53. Caribbean Int’l News Corp. v. Fuentes Agostini, 12 F. Supp. 2d 206, 217 (D.P.R.
1998).
54. Id. Other varied court findings based on the same principle in Ward include
Farnsworth v. City of Mulvane, Kan., 660 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225-26 (D. Kan. 2009) (where
restricting the speech of a private citizen at a city council meeting was viewpoint-based);
Moser v. F.C.C., 826 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Or. 1993), rev’d, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995)
(where a finding that the statute was content-based because of the government’s purpose
was reversed); and Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 670, 688 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (rev’d on other grounds, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999),
rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), and rev’d on other grounds, 262 F.3d 543 (6th
Cir. 2001)) (relying on Ward to identify a content-based purpose justifying strict scrutiny).
55. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 620 (2003).
56. Id. at 621.
57. 530 U.S. 703. See infra notes 62-66.
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and they could be determined in the BART situation. In fact, BART
has made it clear that it terminated wireless service in order to
prevent would-be protestors from communicating information about
58
the protest with each other.
The secondary effects doctrine also focuses on government
purpose rather than on the content neutrality of the application. In
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court determined that a
statute that was content-based on its face was actually content-neutral
59
because of its purposes. There, a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult
theaters from operating in a certain area was reviewed as contentneutral and upheld because the content-neutral purpose was to
protect the neighborhood from the secondary effects of decreased
60
quality of life and property values.
Reliance on Ward and Renton could lead one to believe that a
government regulation that is content-neutral in application but
content-based in purpose would be considered content-based and
subject to strict scrutiny. However, such a position would require
distinguishing the cases upholding speech-free buffer zones around
61
abortion clinics. In Hill, for example, the Court determined that a
restriction on speech within 100 feet of the entrance to an abortion
clinic was content-neutral even though it appeared clear that the
62
purpose of the buffer zone was to silence anti-abortion protests. But
a majority of justices could not agree on the standards by which
content neutrality should be decided. The plurality opinion written
by Justice Stevens held the statute was content-neutral because it did
63
not restrict any viewpoint or subject matter; a concurrence by Justice
Souter, joined by three justices, stated it was content-neutral because
it targeted the delivery of the messages and not the content of the
64
messages themselves; Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justice
Thomas, argued it was content-based because it was a means of
65
impeding speech against abortion as applied; Justice Kennedy wrote

58.
59.
60.
61.
(1994).
62.
63.
64.
65.

Letter From BART, supra note 9.
475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
Id. at 44, 48.
See Hill, 530 U.S. 703 and Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753
Hill, 530 U.S. at 707-09, 725.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 737-38 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a separate dissent and stated that it was content-based because it
66
restricted speech on particular topics.
The point of highlighting this disagreement in Hill is to emphasize
the availability of arguments to a party interested in challenging state
termination of wireless communication and the unsteadiness of the
Court’s approach to actions that are content-neutral on their face and
content-based in their purpose. The Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence leaves open the door for holding that such a regulation,
under circumstances similar to what occurred in San Francisco, would
be treated as content-based because of its purpose and thus subject to
strict scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, an action or statute can only be held
constitutionally valid if a compelling government interest is addressed
through the most narrowly tailored means, in which no alternative
67
means are less restrictive. First, a court must identify a compelling
government interest. In the BART case, two possible government
interests are clear: public safety and regular provision of
transportation services. Public safety has not been held by the
Supreme Court to be a compelling government interest in a speech
68
case, although it has in other contexts that may reasonably be
applied here and in other protest scenarios that have the potential to
become dangerous. As for the second possible state interest, the
Court has never addressed whether providing regular, uninterrupted
transit services is a compelling government interest. However, it may
be a stretch to call such an interest “compelling.” The government
would have an easier time arguing it is compelling if it involved
longer-term access to public transportation or a more urgent need to
move commuters through the system beyond the needs of a regular
weekday rush hour.
Second, the government action must be the most narrowly
tailored, and thus least restrictive, means of achieving the compelling
government interest. Cutting off wireless communications where
public safety is the purported compelling government interest may
likely not be the least restrictive means of achieving that interest
particularly because such an action impinges on the constitutional
right of free speech. BART itself showed it had other better options,

66. Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 813.
68. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 740 (1987).
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such as closing stations as it did later in August of 2011, 69 thereby
reducing the possibility of dangerous clashes among protestors,
commuters, and police without precluding speech. In other protests,
such as the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, police have taken
different measures to quell public safety hazards, such as dispersing
70
people camping in public areas. But where a protest becomes
particularly large and deadly, as in Egypt, the bigger issue is more
likely whether the government’s interest is in fact public safety or the
censorship of political speech. BART did not show its means were
the most narrowly tailored to achieve its ends, regardless of whether
those ends were “compelling.” Future constitutional challenges to
the termination of wireless communications services will likely fail
strict scrutiny.
2.

Even if Such a Regulation is Deemed to be Content-Neutral, it may still be
Unjustified Under the Constitution.

The Court’s test on the constitutionality of a content-neutral
restriction is the “time, place, and manner” doctrine. A contentneutral restriction on First Amendment activities is permissible if it is
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and
71
leaves open ample alternative means of communication. In a protest
scenario, the government could convincingly argue, as under strict
scrutiny review, that its interest was public safety. (Again, BART’s
interest possibly had more to do with providing regular,
uninterrupted service. The Court has not reviewed whether such an
interest is “significant” although it would be more likely to do so than
72
to find it to be “compelling” under strict scrutiny. ) Public safety, the
most likely government interest to be alleged for interrupting wireless

69. Lisa Pickoff-White, BART Shuts Down Stations After Second Anonymous
Protest,
News
Fix,
KQED
NEWS,
(Aug.
22,
2011),
http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2011/08/22/bart-braces-for-another-anonymous-protest/.
70. E.g., James Barron & Colin Moynihan, City Reopens Park After Protesters are
Evicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/nyregion/policebegin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html and Demian Bulwa, Oakland Orders
Occupy Protesters to Leave Plaza, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/20/BATM1LKJ24.DTL. Occupy
was not without its own controversies, perhaps most notably the use of pepper spray
against student protestors at University of California at Davis. Brian Stelter, U.C. Davis
Calls for Investigation After Pepper Spraying, THE LEDE, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 19, 2011),
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/video-of-police-pepper-spraying-u-c-davisstudents-provokes-outrage/.
71. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796, 802.
72. See supra III.A.i.
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communication during a protest, does fall under the category of
73
significant government interests.
The question remains whether the government’s termination of
wireless infrastructure is a narrowly tailored reaction. When a
government regulation is content-neutral, it is considered to be
narrowly tailored if its ends would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation. It remains unclear whether BART’s termination of
cell phone service actually was effective and had an impact on public
safety. After all, people could still wirelessly communicate protest
plans to each other outside of the underground stations. In truth,
they later congregated above ground, potentially creating public
74
safety hazards there, when the stations themselves were shut down.
Furthermore, while such a regulation may appear narrowly
tailored in “time” and “place,” it may not have been in terms of
“manner” and would thus fail the applicable test. The BART
shutdown took place in a discrete and geographical space for a period
75
of a few hours, satisfying the “time” and “place” prongs. But when
reviewing “manner,” one should consider that BART shut down all
cell phone communication, not only the messages it found dangerous
or offensive. While it is not common to do so, particularly in the
United States, a cell phone service provider may have the technology
76
to censor the content of text messages.
Although Egypt may not have left open alternative means of
communication when it shut down mobile phone connections and the
Internet, there is room for debate as to whether BART did so.
Because of the shutdown’s limited geographical reach, a commuter
wanting to use his cell phone could likely just leave the station, go
above ground, and make his call. But an emergency could arise that
prevents him from being able to do so, perhaps the need to stay by
someone having a heart attack or a blockage of the exits by the

73. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768.
74. Pickoff-White, supra note 68.
75. Cabanatuan, supra note 8.
76. See e.g., Reza Sayah, Pakistan Bans ‘Obscene’ Words from Text Messages, CNN
(Nov.
22,
2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/19/world/asia/pakistan-bannedwords/index.html; Chris Matyszczyk, How Google’s Nexus One Censors Cuss Words,
CNET (Jan. 23, 2010) http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-10440115-71.html. But such a
regulation would be content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, upon which the
regulation would fail. See supra III.A.i. It may be conceded, however, that selecting
certain words to censor still would not achieve the government’s aims. For example,
censoring all messages that say “BART,” “4:30,” and “protest” may block out some
innocent messages (“There’s a protest at the BART station at 4:30 so I’ll be late”) and not
other objectionable messages (“Let’s riot at the Civic Center station in half an hour”).

240

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[35:1

protestors. 77 Furthermore, it is not hard to imagine that the
government may shut down wireless services in a larger geographic
area in the future. What alternative means of communication would
be left? Pay phones are disappearing, as is the use of land line phones,
as more and more people rely on their cell phones as their only means
78
of telephonic communication. If the government also shuts down
the means with which to access the Internet, the action would not
have left open ample alternative means of communication and would
fail the time-place-manner test.
Content-neutral regulations also must be shown not to suppress
too much speech by foreclosing an entire medium of expression. The
Court stated in City of Ladue v. Gilleo: “The First Amendment
prohibits not only content-based restrictions that censor particular
points of view, but also content-neutral restrictions that unduly
79
constrict the opportunities for free expression.” In that case, a city
ordinance that generally prohibited display of signs on residential
private property was struck down even though it was assumed to be
80
content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral. “[The city of] Ladue has
almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication
that is both unique and important. It has totally foreclosed that
81
medium to political, religious, or personal messages.” The Court
also noted that residential signs play an important part in political
82
So, too, could this analysis be applied to wireless
campaigns.
communication, which is being made entirely unavailable in the
83
In Ladue, the Court indicated
protest situation posited here.
particular concern for the medium of residential signs to be available
84
for political discourse. The constitutional right to gather people in
order to express political opinions would be severely curtailed by a

77. The F.C.C. estimates 70 percent of 911 calls are made from wireless phones.
Wireless
911
Services,
FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/wireless-911-services (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
78. Brad Tuttle, In the Future: No More . . . Well, No More Lots of Things,
MONEYLAND, TIME, (Jan. 5, 2010), http://moneyland.time.com/2010/01/05/in-the-futureno-more-%E2%80%A6-well-no-more-lots-of-things/.
79. 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (citing Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 46, 57-58 (1987)).
80. Ladue, 512 U.S. at 43.
81. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 55.
83. Even though BART’s action was temporary and the city of Ladue’s was not,
BART may not pass the “time, place, and manner” test due to its failure of the “manner”
prong.
84. Ladue, 512 U.S. at 54-55.
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blanket termination of wireless services. A foreclosure of the use of
those forms of communications would likely mean a foreclosure of
real-time communication and the chilling of political speech. Thus,
even a content-neutral regulation may be constitutionally invalid in
this context.
B. Public Forum Analysis

Whether an area is determined to be a public forum and, if so,
what type of public forum, affects the constitutional standard of
85
review. However, it is unclear how public forum analysis may be
applied here. First, a court would have to consider what the public
forum in question is. In the case of BART, was it the train station or
the coverage of cell phone services? Is it the physical space where
wireless communication services are provided or is it a virtual space
created by a facilitator such as BART? It is hardly a trivial matter
considering that airport terminals were held to be a nonpublic forum
86
in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee. The
Krishna Court’s reasoning fits soundly with a local rail station such as
BART since it determined that “neither by tradition nor purpose can
87
the terminals be described as public fora.” The Port Authority in
Krishna was thus permitted by the Court to restrict expressive
activity, which included solicitation for money. Consider the oftrepeated request to turn off cell phones during flight: analyzing the
public forum as the geographic location protects the government,
acting through the Federal Aviation Administration, when it
disallows cell phone use on airplanes. Like the airport terminal in
Krishna, airplanes and the regional rail station would not likely
receive protection as public forums considering tradition and their
88
primary purpose of transporting people.
A more likely future scenario is a protest at a public outdoor
location, such as city parks, which were used across the country
89
during the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, or city streets. In
that case, the physical location in question would certainly be a

85. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
86. 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
87. Id. at 672.
88. In fact, many BART commuters expressed extreme displeasure at being so
inconvenienced by the 2011 protests. C.W. Nevius, BART Protests: Patrons, Police Losing
Patience, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/08/24/BAB91KRBA5.DTL. See generally the User Comments,
id.
89. OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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traditional public forum. “Wherever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public, and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing
90
Although the Court has identified limits to
public questions.”
91
speech in those areas, public parks and streets receive the highest
92
protection from government attempts to chill free speech.
But does that mean that a protestor needs to choose a street or
park for wireless services to be protected under the First
Amendment? Not necessarily, for the public forum at issue may be
the wireless service area, which was affirmatively created by BART
93
working with private contractors. As a threshold matter, one needs
to consider whether the public forum analysis would even apply to an
area defined by wireless communications service. This doctrine was
rejected in a case considering leased television access channels, given
94
the dynamism of the medium, and the Court repeated the limit of
95
the doctrine with regards to the Internet. “[W]e would hesitate to
import ‘the public forum doctrine . . . wholesale into’ the context of
the Internet. We are wary of the notion that a partial analogy in one
context, for which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full
96
range of decisions in such a new and changing area.” Presumably,
the Court would be just as reluctant to apply public forum analysis to
a cell phone service area.

90. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
91. “In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and
manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
92. Id.
AREA
RAPID
TRANSIT,
93. Wireless
Connections,
BAY
http://www.bart.gov/guide/wireless.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). However, where the
government has not acted affirmatively to provide a forum for speech, public forum
analysis does not apply. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054, 1342 (2d
ed. 2005) (“[T]here generally is no right to use private property for speech purposes . . .
there is no state action, and the Constitution does not apply.”). If the government acts to
terminate a private provider’s wireless service, the doctrines of content neutrality,
overbreadth, and prior restraint will be appropriate instead.
94. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 729
(1996).
95. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205-07 (2003).
96. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 207 n.3 (citing Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 749).
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If the Court were to undertake the public forum analysis with
regards to a wireless service area, it would be left to consider whether
it is a designated public forum or a non-public forum since the
traditional public forum applies only to public locations such as
streets and parks. A non-public forum would receive a lower level of
scrutiny requiring only that it be reasonable and not discriminatory as
97
to viewpoint, but it is unlikely to be a factor in the scenarios
hypothesized here given that wireless communications services are
provided by government agencies for the purpose of facilitating
speech. What is more likely is that the communications area would
be considered a designated public forum because the government
made its property available for the purpose of allowing the free
98
exchange of speech. In the case of BART, the state agency was not
required to provide wireless service but chose to presumably for the
convenience of customers who wanted to be able to use their cell
phones to communicate with others. As such, BART’s wireless
coverage could be considered a designated public forum. Whether a
designated public forum is of a limited or unlimited character,
“[r]egulation of such property is subject to the same limitations as
99
that governing a traditional public forum.” That is to say, any
government efforts to regulate speech in such an area on the basis of
content would be subject to strict scrutiny. But the Court would have
to be willing to extrapolate “property” in the context of the public
100
forum in Perry Education Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n. to
include the virtual space of a wireless service area, perhaps by
flouting its reluctance to do so in United States v. American Library
101
Ass’n. Inc.
In summary, what is most important to determine under the
public forum doctrine is which potential public forum is at issue. A
traditional public forum such as a public park or street would receive
the highest First Amendment protection, as strict scrutiny must be
applied to any government regulation on speech. An area in which
the government has provided, or facilitated in providing, Internet or
wireless phone access may either be a designated public forum, also
subject to strict scrutiny, or may not even be a public forum for the
purposes of this analysis. In the latter case, First Amendment

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
Id. at 37.
Krishna, 505 U.S. at 678.
460 U.S. at 37.
539 U.S. at 205-07.
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protection may come instead from a finding of the action being
content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny.
C. Overbreadth

The overbreadth doctrine invalidates government action that
substantially inhibits more speech than is necessary to punish
unprotected speech, according to the Court’s holding in Broadrick v.
102
Oklahoma. Even assuming that it is proper for the government to
stop protestors from using their phones to gather, one must consider
103
how much innocuous and constitutionally protected speech is being
chilled when the government terminates wireless communication in
an area. A court could find that too many innocuous messages were
blocked through the manner in which BART interrupted wireless
communication. Consider also Egypt, which ended up restricting a
disproportionate number of apolitical individuals, including the
104
business community, in its efforts to quell protests.
Relevant cases have hinged on what kind of speech was banned.
The Court most recently identified an instance of overbreadth,
consistent with Broadrick, in 2010 in the case of United States v.
105
In that case, a federal ban on the creation, sale, and
Stevens.
possession of videos of animal cruelty was found to be overbroad,
covering too many areas of protected speech, particularly because the
106
States disagree as to what constitutes animal cruelty. Contrast Bd.
of Airport Comissioners of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.,
where a ban on all “First Amendment activities” at an airport was
107
The Respondents in that case had
determined to be overbroad.
been stopped from distributing religious literature, but the Court
found the regulation even “prohibit[ed] talking and reading, or the
108
wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing.”
In the case of BART, the termination of certain technological
services—rather than an inelegantly worded statute, as in Stevens and

102. 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
103. See generally, Christine Rosen, Our Cell Phones, Ourselves, THE NEW ATLANTIS,
(Summer 2004), http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/our-cell-phones-ourselves
(describing common cell phone use as including making appointments, locating a friend,
checking voicemail messages, or checking in at work).
104. Alexandra Dunn, Unplugging A Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt’s
January 25 Uprising, 35-SUM FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 15 (2011).
105. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
106. Id. at 1588-91.
107. 482 U.S. 569, 569 (1987).
108. Id. at 575.
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Jews for Jesus—makes it clear what speech is being foreclosed: speech
that takes place on a cell phone. The Court, which balked at the
109
restriction of talking and reading at an airport in Jews for Jesus and
110
of hunting videos in Stevens, should take as much issue with the
prevention of the type of speech that so often occurs through cell
phone communication. A summary of an average person’s cell phone
use, including live conversations, voicemail, and text messages, is
likely to include such communication as, “Let’s go to the 8 p.m.
movie;” “I want to sell 100 shares of GloboStock;” and “Don’t you
think Mom is being unreasonable?”—all constitutionally protected
111
speech. Cell phones are used for social gaming as well, but even the
content of video games was found to be protected by the First
112
Amendment in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n..
While
any government agency that shuts down cell phone or Internet service
may claim a legitimate reason for doing so, it will no doubt face an
overbreadth problem by prohibiting a substantial amount of harmless
speech.
The Court faced a similar question in considering two acts
intended to prevent children’s exposure to obscenities online, where
one was found to be overbroad and invalidated and the other was
upheld.
In Reno, the Court reviewed portions of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, finding them to be
overbroad as well as content-based and not sufficiently narrowly
113
tailored in a 7-2 decision. The CDA, which criminally prohibited
the knowing transmission, by means of a telecommunications device,
of “obscene or indecent” material and the knowing use of an
interactive computer service to send that material to a minor, lacked
114
the precision required by the First Amendment. “In order to deny
minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional
115
right to receive and to address to one another.” Its breadth was
wholly unprecedented, encompassing nonprofits and individuals
posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers

109. Id.
110. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
111. See e.g., Maria Sciullo, Words with Friends Soars in Popularity, CHICAGO SUNTIMES, Sep. 26, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/lifestyles/7806663-423/words-with-friendssoars-in-popularity.html
112. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2731 (2011).
113. Reno, 521 U.S. at 848, 864, 868, 882.
114. Id. at 844, 874.
115. Id. at 874.
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in the presence of minors. 116 The CDA’s use of the terms “indecent”
and “patently offensive” were undefined and “cover[ed] large
amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or
117
other value.” The Court, citing the District Court’s decision below,
also noted that there was no practical way—given existing
technology—to deny minors access to certain communication without
118
also denying access to adults.
However, an act targeting the same behavior was upheld in 2002
by the Court. In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, the
Court, voting 5-4, declined to find that the Child Online Protection
119
COPA was distinguished from the
Act (COPA) was overbroad.
CDA for applying to significantly less material than did the CDA by
120
defining the offensive material more narrowly. In particular, the
Court decided that COPA’s reliance on “contemporary community
standards” for determining what material is harmful to minors was
121
not overbroad. But while it alluded to the technological difficulties
122
in limiting the availability of Internet material to a geographic area,
the majority did not address a fatal point it identified in Reno, that
denying minors access to some material would mean denying adults
123
the same access. Instead, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
found the technological limitations relevant in that different
124
geographic areas may have different community standards.
Although members of the Court penned five different opinions in
Ashcroft, only Justice Stevens, in his dissent, referred specifically to
the problem of overbreadth where the Internet has technological
limitations in restricting access based on the age of the user:
COPA seeks to limit protected speech that is not targeted at
children, simply because it can be obtained by them while
surfing the Web. In evaluating the overbreadth of such a
statute, we should be mindful of Justice Frankfurter’s
admonition not to ‘burn the house to roast the pig.’ COPA

116. Id. at 877.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 876.
119. 535 U.S. 564, 584-85 (2002). However, the majority upheld the district court’s
preliminary injunction on other grounds. Id. at 565.
120. Id. at 578.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 575.
123. Id. at 568.
124. Id. at 577.
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not only restricts speech that is made available to the general
public, it also covers a medium in which speech cannot be
segregated to avoid communities where it is likely to be
considered harmful to minors. The Internet presents a unique
forum for communication because information, once posted,
is accessible everywhere on the network at once. . . . Even the
narrowest version of the statute abridges a substantial amount
of protected speech that many communities would not find
harmful to minors. Because Web speakers cannot limit access
to those specific communities, the statute is substantially
overbroad . . . [T]he audience cannot self-segregate. As a
result, in the context of the Internet this shield also becomes a
sword, because the community that wishes to live without
certain material rids not only itself, but the entire Internet of
125
the offending speech.
Stevens’s acknowledgement of the inability of users to selfsegregate may be the key to deciding, as the Court did in Reno, that a
statute restricting Internet access for minors is overbroad because of
its effect on adults. In the BART example, the same analysis could
be applied in deciding that the technological limitations in blocking
certain content to certain people will mean that a regulation blocking
all messages to everyone will be overbroad.
One might find a window of flexibility, however, in the Broadrick
requirement that only a regulation that prohibits substantially more
speech than is necessary is overbroad. A question exists if it was truly
necessary for BART to terminate cell phone service during an
expected time of protest. Although the protest with which BART
126
was concerned moved above ground, it is impossible to know
whether allowing cell phone communication would have resulted in a
situation underground that would have compromised public safety.
However, it is not difficult to imagine a dire scenario that might
justify interrupting wireless communication. For example, cell
127
If the
phones have been used in combat to trigger explosives.
government received a credible tip that a bomb had been planted at
Civic Center Plaza in San Francisco and would be detonated via
125. Id. at 604-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Pickoff-White, supra note 68.
127. Cargo Plane Bomb Plot: Explosive Fears Could Spell End of In-Flight Wi-Fi, THE
TELEGRAPH,
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/mobilephones/8108185/Cargo-plane-bomb-plot-Explosive-fears-could-spell-end-of-in-flight-WiFi.html.
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wireless communication at a given time on a given day, certainly
many people would agree with the constitutionality of a government
action to shut off wireless services in the area where the bomb was
128
While the government regulation would
thought to be located.
likely have an impact on a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected speech, it could be justified as “necessary” under Broadrick
considering the technological limitations of segregating wireless
speech and the graveness of the government interest. Short of such
circumstances, terminating wireless services in a geographic area
should be considered overbroad and thus unconstitutional.
D. Prior Restraint

The doctrine of prior restraint is usually applied to government
129
actions such as injunctions or requiring licenses to create speech.
Although the government action to terminate wireless
communication services is neither, it still constitutes a state action
that prevents speech from occurring. Such actions are deemed to be
constitutionally invalid as in the canonical case of Near v. State of
130
Minnesota ex rel. Olson. In that case, the Court held a statute that
targeted the distribution of malicious or scandalous material prior to
131
publication constituted the “essence of censorship.” However, it
acknowledged limited circumstances in which such prior restraint on
speech would be permitted, including national security concerns and
132
preventing obscenity. The Court provided the paradigm example:
“No one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing
133
dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”
The Court further clarified its position in New York Times Co. v.
134
United States, relying on Near but also allowing the government to
meet a “heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
135
such a restraint.” In that case, the Court found the government had
not met its burden in enjoining the publication of the Pentagon

128. The FCC envisions such a scenario. Commission Seeks Comment, supra note 15.
129. See Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) and City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
130. 283 U.S. at 713.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 716.
133. Id.
134. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
135. Id. at 714 (citing Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
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Papers. 136 This threshold fits appropriately with the BART situation
and the hypothetical scenario where the government expects a bomb
to be triggered by a wireless device. Under New York Times, it would
be more challenging for the government to justify its restraint on
speech in the case of BART as it would in the hypothetical bomb
scenario, as it should be—the greater the government interest, the
more likely it could justify a prior restraint on speech.
In a previous situation where neither an injunction nor a license
137
to speak was involved, the Court declined to find a prior restraint.
However, the holding in Hill, which involved a speech-free buffer
zone around an abortion clinic, was premised on several factors that
aren’t present here. The Hill Court found relevant, for example, that
no channel of communication was foreclosed by the regulation and
that the restriction only applies if the hearer doesn’t consent to being
138
The case of BART is contrasted with a foreclosure of
approached.
an entire medium and the fact that the recipients of potential cell
phone communication by BART users would have likely welcomed
the communication. Nonetheless, the Hill Court also found that the
prior restraint doctrine applies to restrictions imposed by official
139
censorship.
Thus, the restricted application of the prior restraint doctrine in
Hill conflicts with the principles behind Near and New York Times.
Consider the fear that troop movements will be shared with the
wrong party. Would it matter, under the prior restraint doctrine, if
the troop movements were published in a newspaper, or if someone
shouted them out loud to an unwilling listener outside an abortion
clinic? The Court is surely more concerned about the content of
speech, when it involves national security, than the means in which
such sensitive speech is restrained. A focus on the substance of this
doctrine, rather than its form, results in the conclusion that a
termination of wireless services could be considered a prior restraint
on speech and invalid when the government has failed to meet its
heavy burden in justifying it.

IV. CONCLUSION
When BART terminated cell phone and wireless services to
silence a protest on Aug. 11, 2011, it added fuel to the fire. The
136. Id.
137. Hill, 530 U.S. at 734-35.
138. Id. at 734.
139. Id.
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protestors were now not only angry about the incident that provoked
the protest in the first place, a fatal shooting of a knife-wielding man
by a BART police officer, but also about what appeared to be an
infringement of their First Amendment rights. BART’s decision to
terminate wireless services caused alarm as well because of the
similarities to what autocratic regimes have done across the world to
quell protest.
But the United States, unlike Mubarak’s Egypt and modern
China, values the rights of people to have opinions, particularly
regarding politics and government action, and to share them with the
public.
This should not change even when new forms of
communication, such as cell phone and other wireless services, are
made available by the government.
The importance of safeguarding speech that takes place over
wireless communications devices is not only based in principle but in
the constitutional doctrines of the First Amendment. BART’s actions
would likely be held invalid under the doctrines of content neutrality,
public forum analysis, overbreadth, and prior restraint. Any future
government action that disables the public’s access to wireless
communications should also be considered suspect.

